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Development, Berlin, Germany
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Canada
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Belief bias is the tendency for prior beliefs to influence people’s deductive
reasoning in two ways: through the application of a simple belief-heuristic
(response bias) and through the application of more effortful reasoning for
unbelievable conclusions (accuracy effect or motivated reasoning). Previous
research indicates that cognitive ability is the primary determinant of the effect of
beliefs on accuracy. In the current study, we show that the mere tendency to
engage analytic reasoning (analytic cognitive style) is responsible for the effect of
cognitive ability on motivated reasoning. The implications of this finding for
our understanding of the impact of individual differences on belief bias are
discussed.
Keywords: Belief bias; Motivated reasoning; Response bias; Analytic cognitive
style; Cognitive ability; Individual differences; Signal detection theory.
People often think in a more effortful manner when faced with statements
with which they disagree. Climate change deniers are an extreme example of
this phenomenon: When faced with an unbelievable statement (the climate
is changing), they recruit more effortful thinking to discredit the strong evi-
dence in favour of climate change (Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac,
2013). This is a very general example of a specific form of belief bias which
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we will refer to as motivated reasoning1 (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983).
Beliefs also impact the judgement process in a more shallow way: Believable
arguments are more commonly accepted than unbelievable arguments,
something we refer to as response bias.2 We investigate these effects within a
syllogistic reasoning paradigm (Evans et al., 1983).
Whereas response bias is a commonly accepted component of belief bias,
the role of motivated reasoning is controversial. The controversial nature of
motivated reasoning stems from the fact that much evidence for it stems
from the problematic analysis of acceptance rates (Dube, Rotello, & Heit,
2010; Heit & Rotello, 2014; Klauer, Musch, & Naumer, 2000). Klauer et al.
(2000) demonstrated how a formal modelling approach based on multino-
mial processing tree (MPT) analysis could overcome these deficits. Follow-
ing up on this work, Dube et al. (2010) used signal detection theory (SDT)
to disentangle the contribution of beliefs to changes in response bias and
accuracy. Their data was consistent with the idea that belief bias may just be
a response bias. Trippas, Handley, and Verde (2013), using SDT, only par-
tially replicated their finding. In contrast to the lower cognitive ability (CA)
participants who operated according to the response bias account, higher
CA participants showed more signs of motivated reasoning These findings
were replicated and extended in an additional study using the forced-choice
reasoning paradigm (Trippas, Verde, & Handley, 2014b). In the current
paper, we follow up on the well-established result that the propensity to
engage in motivated reasoning differs as a function of individual difference
variables linked to analytic processing. We test the alternative hypothesis
that the mere willingness to engage deliberative reasoning processes (i.e.,
analytic cognitive style [ACS]), rather than the ability to do so (CA), is the
driving force behind motivated reasoning.
Individual differences in reasoning
While CA plays an important role in reasoning and decision making, theory
and research suggest that ACS may be even more important (Stanovich &
West, 2000). The precedence of ACS over CA has been established in both
low-level (e.g., perceptual judgement: Klein, 1951) and high-level (e.g.,
education: Sternberg & Zhang, 2001) domains. Recent research indicates
1 In the remainder of this paper, we use the term “motivated reasoning” strictly to refer to
the tendency for logical reasoning accuracy to be higher for unbelievable than for believable syl-
logisms. This should not be confused with other interpretations of motivated reasoning such as
rationalising statements which have actual utility to the reasoner.
2 By response bias, we refer to the tendency for participants to accept believable problems
more than unbelievable ones. Note that from a formal modelling perspective, this can be charac-
terised equally well in terms of a criterion shift or a symmetrical shift in the underlying distribu-
tions of argument strength.
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that ACS independently predicts the degree of religious and paranormal
belief (Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012) and moral
judgement (Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2014a), sug-
gesting that the motivation to engage analytic reasoning processes may in
fact have a stronger influence on certain reasoning outputs in everyday con-
texts than does the ability to reason analytically.
The increased predictive power of ACS over CA in a variety of fields sug-
gests that ACS could play an important role in motivated reasoning. This is
corroborated by the finding that the cognitive reflection test (CRT; Freder-
ick, 2005), a measure of ACS, explains additional variance in the tendency
show various thinking and reasoning biases beyond CA alone (Toplak,
West, & Stanovich, 2011, 2014). Given that ACS and CA are highly related,
yet separate concepts (r  .50: Frederick, 2005; Toplak et al., 2011, 2014), a
viable alternative explanation for the CAmotivated reasoning link is that
perhaps ACS is the critical factor. This leaves two competing hypotheses. If
CA is the stronger predictor, then it would suggest the difference in the pro-
pensity to show motivated reasoning is a quality effect (Evans, 2007; Thomp-
son & Johnson, 2014): Better and poorer reasoners are equally likely to
apply analytic processing when facing unbelievable conclusions, but better
reasoners succeed because their analytic processing is superior. Conversely,
if ACS is more important, then this would suggest a quantity effect: Better
and poorer reasoners differ in the amount of analytical processing they are
willing to engage in when faced with unbelievable conclusions, and better
reasoners achieve higher reasoning accuracy under these circumstances
because they engage in more analytic processing.
We pitted these hypotheses opposite one another in a large-sample, high-
powered individual differences study using a formal modelling approach
based on SDT. As discussed earlier, the use of a formal framework such as
SDT is necessary to overcome the serious shortcomings of analysing raw
endorsement rates (Dube et al., 2010; Heit & Rotello, 2014; Klauer et al.,
2000; Trippas et al., 2014c; although see Singmann & Kellen, 2014, and
Trippas, Verde, & Handley, 2015, for a reply). The role of individual differ-
ences in ACS and CA for belief bias has not been investigated within a for-
mal modelling framework, questioning the reliability of previous work. Our
main aim was to determine whether the relation between motivated reason-
ing and CA may be driven by ACS. We also investigated the impact of CA
and ACS on reasoning accuracy and response bias.
Typically CA is measured using standard measures of fluid and crystal-
lised intelligence such as IQ tests, whereas ACS is measured using self-report
scales such as the Actively Open-Minded Thinking scale (AOT) or the Need
for Cognition (NFC) questionnaire. One advantage of these measures is that
they are well validated from a psychometric perspective. On the other hand,
the fact that the measurement format differs substantially between these two
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constructs can be an issue of some concern, particularly when investigating
deductive reasoning, itself a performance-based behavioural task. Attempting
to equate the measurement format across all three constructs, in the current
experiment we opted to use a battery of tasks that use items with a similar
format to measure CA (numeracy, WordSum, and neutral base-rate neglect
problems) and ACS behaviourally (CRT, ratio bias, and incongruent base-
rate neglect problems; see the Method section for additional details).
Naturally, using performance-based measures to assess ACS means that
all ACS and CA measures necessarily require some degree of ability and cog-
nitive style (for a similar discussion in this journal, see Pennycook et al.,
2014a). Theoretically, it is impossible to develop a performance-based mea-
sure that only reflects ability or style, but not both. If one does not have the
willingness to think analytically when given a problem, the ability to com-
pute the solution to the problem will not help. Likewise, if one does not
have a requisite level of CA, the willingness to think analytically will not be
at all beneficial. Since this is true of both ACS and CA measures, the meas-
ures should be viewed as more reflective of one construct over the other, but
not as purely one or the other. The key factor that distinguishes ACS and
CA measures used here is the presence of an incorrect intuitive lure that
necessitates an additional level of analytic reasoning. For example, whereas
incongruent base-rate neglect problems contain a conflict between a salient
stereotype and base-rate information (see Table S1 in the supplementary
materials for an example), neutral base-rate neglect problems do not contain
any stereotypical information. Thus, the incongruent base-rate problem is
considered an ACS measure because it cues an intuitive response based on
the stereotypical information that requires an extra level of analytic reason-
ing to override, whereas the neutral base-rate problem is considered a CA
measure because it assesses one’s ability to use base-rate information in
judgement (see De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Pennycook, Trippas, Handley, &
Thompson, 2014b). Based on our previous work (Trippas et al., 2013), we
predict systematic individual differences in the tendency to show motivated
reasoning as a function of analytic factors. If the quality hypothesis holds,
CA should be a better predictor of motivated reasoning than ACS. Con-
versely, according to the quantity hypothesis, ACS should be a better predic-
tor of motivated reasoning than CA.
METHOD
Participants
A total of 191 University of Waterloo undergraduates volunteered to take
part in the study (62 male, 129 female, age range D 1750, M D 20, SD D
3). Individual differences data was unavailable for nine participants.
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Design
Logical validity (valid vs. invalid) was crossed with conclusion believability
(believable vs. unbelievable) in a within-subjects design.
Materials and measures
Belief bias. Eight valid and eight invalid syllogisms were repeated four times
with randomly assigned item contents for each participant (cf.Trippas et al.,
2013). Belief was manipulated using true or false item contents (e.g., believ-
able: Some animals are not cats, unbelievable: Some cats are not animals).
Half the arguments had unbelievable conclusions. Premise believability was
controlled for using pseudo-word middle terms (see Table 1).
Participants made validity (valid or invalid) and confidence judgements
from 1 (not confident) to 3 (very confident) on each trial.
Cognitive style and ability. Participants were given six different measures
that have been successfully used in past research to differentially measure
ACS or CA (Pennycook et al., 2012; Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, &
Fugelsang, 2013; Pennycook et al., 2014a). The key factor that distinguishes
these measures is the presence of a misleading intuitive response cue. Con-
sider the following item from the CRT (Frederick, 2005):
A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball.
How much does the ball cost?
This problem cues a salient response (i.e., 10 cents) that is incorrect.
While the arithmetic required to solve this problem is straightforward, only
TABLE 1
Randomly generated examples of the reasoning problems used in the experiment
Valid Invalid
Believable P1: No saws are veemers P1: Some haddocks are curges
P2: Some tools are veemers P2: No curges are fish
C: Some tools are not saws C: Some fish are not haddocks
Unbelievable P1: No birds are pinds P1: No spears are blans
P2: Some pinds are parrots P2: Some weapons are blans
C: Some parrots are not birds C: Some spears are not weapons
P1 D first premise, P2 D second premise, C D conclusions. Syllogistic figure, atmosphere, and
illicit conversion were controlled for in the experiment.
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around 40% of a standard university sample correctly solve it (Frederick,
2005). This and other CRT items are “difficult” because one must engage
effortful reasoning to question, inhibit, and override a salient intuitive
response. Differences in ACS are more important for problems such as this
because one must be motivated to reflect on an answer that “feels” correct
(Thompson, Prowse Turner, & Pennycook, 2011).
Although ACS measures are not particularly difficult in terms of the
mental operations required to correctly solve them, CA is still a prerequi-
site for optimal performance (Pennycook et al., 2012, 2013, 2014a). Our
CA measures were roughly equivalent in terms of difficulty, but did not
cue misleading intuitive responses. In some cases, CA measures were
selected as matched controls. For example, participants completed both
the CRT (an ACS measure) and a numeracy task (a CA measure). As we
have argued in the introduction, this is preferable to the traditional
approach (Toplak et al., 2011, 2014) of assessing cognitive style using
self-report questionnaires (e.g., the Need for Cognition scale or the
Actively Open-Minded Thinking scale) because the syllogistic reasoning
task is a performance measure. Given that CA tests are also performance
measures, measuring ACS via self-report questionnaires creates a funda-
mental asymmetry that biases the necessary regression analysis, poten-
tially making CA seem a stronger predictor in the full model than
warranted. This explains the relatively poor performance of ACS ques-
tionnaires relative to performance-based cognitive style measures, such as
the CRT and other heuristics and biases tasks (Toplak et al., 2011, 2014).
We want to stress that the CRT explains variance in questionnaire meas-
ures of thinking dispositions above and beyond that explained by CA,
demonstrating that it is an adequate measure of ACS when CA is con-
trolled for (Toplak et al., 2011, 2014).
Full explication of individual difference variables with examples can
be found in the supplementary materials (Tables S1 and S2). Participants
completed three CRT problems, six incongruent base-rate problems (De
Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Pennycook et al., 2012, 2013, 2014a), and 18
ratio bias problems (Bonner & Newell, 2010) as ACS measures. Partici-
pants completed 3 numeracy problems (Pennycook et al., 2012, 2013,
2014a; Schwartz, Woloshin, Black, & Welch, 1997), 6 neutral base-rate
problems (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Pennycook et al., 2012, 2013,
2014a), and the 10-item WordSum verbal intelligence test (Huang &
Hauser, 1998; Pennycook et al., 2012, 2013, 2014a) as CA measures. ACS
and CA were computed by averaging across the mean accuracy of
the standardised measures outlined above as is common practice (e.g.,
Pennycook et al., 2012, 2013, 2014a; Toplak et al., 2011, 2014).
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Procedure
Participants were tested individually in laboratory sessions lasting around 45
minutes. Measures were administered in the following order: base rate, ratio
bias, CRT, numeracy, WordSum, syllogisms.
RESULTS
Data treatment
Using the confidence rating based receiving operator characteristic (ROC)
method, which is part of the SDT framework, we calculated the ROC-logic,
ROC-belief, and ROC-interaction indices to quantify the effects of reason-
ing accuracy, response bias, and motivated reasoning, respectively (see
Trippas, Handley, & Verde, 2014a, for a detailed explanation and tutorial).
These measures can be thought of as SDT-equivalents of the traditional
logic, belief, and interaction index (see Table 2 for an overview on how to
derive these indices from raw endorsement rates). Unlike the traditional
indices, these measures do not suffer from inflated Type 1 error rates (Heit
& Rotello, 2014). The model fit the data well in more than 85% of the cases
(i.e., p> .05 based on a x2 test of absolute goodness of fit). Removing partic-
ipants for who model fit was violated from the analysis did not change the
conclusions.
TABLE 2
Deriving the traditional logic, belief, and interaction indices from endorsement rate data
Endorsement rate Valid Invalid
Believable VB D .84 IB D .61
Unbelievable VU D .63 IU D .33
The logic index, a measure of reasoning aptitude or accuracy, can be calculated using the for-
mula: VB C VU  IB  IU D .53. Higher values indicate higher reasoning accuracy. The belief
index, a measure of the tendency to accept believable problems over unbelievable problems, can
be calculated using the formula VBC IB VU  IUD .49. Higher values indicate a greater ten-
dency to accept believable over unbelievable problems, which we have defined as response bias.
The interaction index, a measure of the tendency to reason better for unbelievable compared to
believable problems, can be calculated using the formula VU C IB  VB  IU D .07. Higher
values indicate a greater tendency to engage in what we have defined as motivated reasoning.
The ROC-logic, ROC-belief, and ROC-interaction indices are corrected versions of these flawed
(Heit & Rotello, 2014) traditional measures based on SDT analysis (Trippas et al., 2014a).
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Preliminary analysis
Based on a boxplot of CA, one outlier was removed from all further analy-
ses. There were no outliers for ACS. We investigated whether the
aggregate sample (ignoring individual differences) reasoned above chance,
showed a response bias, and showed a motivated reasoning effect, using
one-sample t-tests on the ROC-logic, ROC-belief, and ROC-interaction
indices. Participants significantly reasoned above chance (M ROC-logic
index D .77, equivalent accuracy rate D 71%), t(181) D 13.26, p < .001.
Participants showed the typical response bias component of belief bias
(M ROC-belief index D .67, equivalent acceptance rate for believable prob-
lems D 73%; for unbelievable problems D 48%), t(181) D 9.89,
p < .001. There was a trend towards a small motivated reasoning effect in
the aggregate sample (M ROC-interaction index D .11, equivalent propor-
tion correct for believable problems D 66%; for unbelievable problems D
68%), t(181) D 1.77, p D .078. Note that this weak motivated reasoning
effect is exactly what is expected from the aggregate analysis if only a subset
of participants engage in motivated reasoning (cf.Trippas et al., 2013).
Main analysis
Given the continuous nature of our variables, we used multiple linear regres-
sions to investigate the role of ACS and CA on reasoning accuracy, response
bias, and motivated reasoning.3 We also investigated whether including one
predictor over the other explained additional variance for each of our three
criteria of interest. Regression results are reported in Table 3. A priori power
analysis for multiple linear regression assuming a small to medium effect size
of f2D .10, an alpha level of .05, and two predictors indicated that a sample of
99 participants was sufficient to obtain a power level of .80. Our sample size
well exceeds this criterion, demonstrating this is a high-powered experiment.
Reasoning ability. CA and ACS were both positive significant predictors of
the ROC-logic index, demonstrating that those of higher cognitive capacity
and higher cognitive style alike reasoned better. Importantly, cognitive
capacity and cognitive style predicted reasoning ability independently, sug-
gesting that the two explain independent sources of variance in reasoning
ability.
Response bias. CA and ACS were both negative significant predictors of the
ROC-belief index, demonstrating that higher CA as well as higher cognitive
3A correlation matrix of all the measures is available in the supplementary materials (see
Table S3).
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style reasoners were less likely to show a belief-based response bias. This
result must be qualified by the fact that when both predictors are included,
only ACS remains significant. This is consistent with the idea that the effect
of CA on belief bias is mediated by ACS.
Motivated reasoning. CA and ACS were both positive predictors of the
ROC-interaction index (CA was just shy of significance at pD .058), suggest-
ing that higher ability and style lead to an increased propensity to reason
better for unbelievable than for believable problems. Crucially, when both
predictors were simultaneously included in the model, only ACS remained
significant. This suggests, as with the response bias component, that ACS is
the main driving force of the motivated reasoning component of belief bias.
We discuss the implications of these findings in more detail in the discussion.
To aid interpretation of these effects, endorsement rates are presented in
Table 4.
DISCUSSION
Using an SDT approach, we replicated Trippas et al.’s (2013) finding that
CA was positively related to the motivated reasoning component of belief
bias. An additional, novel finding was that ACS also positively predicted
motivated reasoning. In contrast to the current interpretation of the effect
of individual differences on motivated reasoning, cognitive style emerged as
the more potent predictor. Interestingly, high CA and ACS also led to a
decreased tendency to accept believable over unbelievable problems (i.e., the
TABLE 3
Regression analyses
Criterion Predictor(s) b(s) p(s) F R2
ROC-logic CA 2.25 <.001 37.4 .17
ACS 1.32 <.001 34.8 .16
CAC ACS 1.48;.79 <.001; <.001 23.8 .21
ROC-belief CA 1.51 .001 10.5 .06
ACS 1.22 <.001 20.1 .10
CAC ACS .46; 1.06 .41; .002 10.4 .10
ROC-interaction CA .86 .058 3.6 .02
ACS .92 <.001 11.8 .06
CAC ACS .06;.94 .91; .005 5.9 .06
When multiple predictors are included, b and p values are reported in the order CA; ACS. F
refers to the fit of the full model and has denominator degrees of freedom 179 or 178, depending
on whether one or two predictors were included, respectively.
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response bias component of belief bias), once again with the latter being the
critical component. Reasoning accuracy was also positively related to ACS
and CA. In contrast to the motivated reasoning and response bias findings,
ability and style had a similar effect on accuracy. This suggests that a crucial
difference between ability and style is that, while both generally support
improved reasoning, cognitive style specifically drives both components of
belief bias. We want to stress that these findings are based on a formal
modelling approach as recommended by Klauer et al. (2000) and Heit and
Rotello (2014).
Turning to the quality/quantity distinction introduced by Evans (2007)
and further investigated by Thompson and Johnson (2014), we must note
that our findings support both interpretations, depending on the dependent
variable of interest. According to the quality interpretation, individual dif-
ferences in thinking are driven by an increased ability to apply analytic
thinking. In other words, poor and good thinkers apply similar amounts of
effort, but the good ones are better because their analytic thinking is some-
how better (e.g., because they are more efficient). According to the quantity
interpretation, individual differences in thinking arise from the degree to
which people engage analytic thinking, with more capable reasoners simply
thinking more than less capable ones. The quality/quantity distinction can
be mapped neatly onto the CA/ACS distinction: Higher ability people rea-
son better because they have more resources, allowing for qualitatively bet-
ter reasoning, whereas higher style people reason more because they choose
to do so. Our findings clearly suggest that when it comes to overall reasoning
accuracy, ability and style are independent predictors, consistent with the
idea that better reasoning happens due to both increase in quality and
increase in quantity. In contrast, the tendency to resist applying a simple
response bias and the propensity to reason more when faced with
TABLE 4
Endorsement rates per condition
Valid Invalid
Variable Classification Believable Unbelievable Believable Unbelievable
Total .84 (.16) .63 (.31) .61 (.26) .33 (.24)
Cognitive ability High .83 (.17) .73 (.27) .55 (.28) .30 (.24)
Low .85 (.14) .53 (.31) .67 (.23) .36 (.24)
Analytic cognitive style High .81 (.18) .75 (.22) .53 (.27) .31 (.23)
Low .86 (.14) .53 (.34) .69 (.24) .35 (.25)
Means (standard deviations). Endorsement rates equal the proportions of “valid” responses.
Participants were classified as part of the higher or lower group using median splits.
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unbelievable conclusions seem to be a quantity effect. People resist the
response bias and show motivated reasoning because they use more analytic
processing, not because their effortful thought is better.
These findings suggest that all of the currently plausible accounts of
belief bias such as mental models theory (MMT; Oakhill, Garnham, &
Johnson-Laird, 1989), selective processing theory (SPT; Evans, Handley, &
Harper, 2001; Klauer et al., 2000), and the strict version of the response
bias account (Dube et al., 2010) require some revision to account for these
data. The strict version of the response bias account does not make any
explicit predictions about the role of individual differences in belief bias,
although it could be extended to do so. Crucially, however, the account pre-
dicts that motivated reasoning is not a fundamental component of belief
bias. This strong assumption has been refuted in the current experiment
(see also Trippas et al., 2013, Trippas et al., 2014a, 2014b). According to
MMT, belief bias operates on two levels. Reasoners show a general
response bias in terms of a conclusion filtering mechanism, as well as a ten-
dency to generate more mental models if the conclusion under consider-
ation is unbelievable. MMT does not, however, predict that increased levels
of ACS are linked to a decrease in response bias. MMT does predict that
those of higher working memory capacity are more likely to retrieve addi-
tional models, but our findings suggest that the willingness to reason (style),
rather than the capacity, is the crucial predictor. A similar argument can be
made for SPT, which is highly similar to MMT with the exception that typi-
cally only one mental model is thought to be constructed. Unbelievable
conclusions cue a difference reasoning style by increasing the propensity to
falsify, rather than confirm, the conclusion. However, according to SPT
this tendency to falsify is mainly a function of problem features, not indi-
vidual differences. This assumption has been revised in a recent extension
of SPT (Stupple, Ball, Evans, & Kamal-Smith, 2011). According to this
individual difference version of SPT, better reasoners (as measured using
reasoning accuracy) are more likely to show response latency characteristics
typically associated with motivated reasoning (although see Thompson,
Morley, & Newstead, 2011, for a counterargument). However, the extended
SPT model explicitly assumes that analytic inhibition is a crucial factor in
driving this pattern, implying that CA is the critical component. Our find-
ings suggest that not the ability to inhibit, but the willingness to think ana-
lytically is linked to motivated reasoning. Identifying ACS, rather than CA,
as a key predictor of motivated reasoning provides a focus for the investiga-
tion of factors that drive other forms of reasoning strategies.
This pattern of findings paints a novel picture of the role of individual
differences in belief bias. One speculative interpretation of these findings
could be in terms of an overarching individual difference framework in
ANALYTIC STYLE PREDICTS BELIEF BIAS 441
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 Pl
ym
ou
th]
 at
 07
:01
 15
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
17
 
which ability and style both predict actual reasoning performance, with only
style being linked to both components of belief bias. Such a framework may
provide a way to integrate multiple algorithmic theories of belief bias (e.g.,
SPT and the response bias account). Our data suggests that individuals with
higher CA but relatively lower levels of ACS will operate as predicted by the
response bias account: showing adequate reasoning performance with a
response bias, but lacking motivated reasoning. In contrast, individuals with
higher levels of both cognitive ability and style might reason more in line
with predictions drawn from SPT: i.e., showing above average reasoning
performance in combination with motivated reasoning, but with lower levels
of response bias. Interpreted in terms of dual process theory (DPT), these
findings suggest that the response bias component of belief bias is a marker
of T1 processing. In contrast, reasoning accuracy and motivated reasoning
appear to be determined by T2 processing.
A potential caveat of the present findings is that we measured CA and
ACS using a nonstandardised battery of tasks, including ratio bias, base-
rate neglect, numeracy, the CRT, and the WordSum, instead of more stand-
ardised tests such as Raven’s progressive matrices (Raven, 2000) and the
Actively Open Minded Thinking scale (AOT: Stanovich & West, 2000). We
reiterate in this respect that our measures have been used successfully in the
past to compare the relative influence of ACS with CA on multiple outcome
variables, including religious beliefs, reasoning aptitude, and moral judge-
ments (Pennycook et al., 2012, 2013, 2014a). One might even argue that our
use of a behavioural rather than a self-report measure of ACS is a strength
of the current design. As a parallel, consider the increased predictability of
behaviourally measured implicit attitudes (using the implicit association
test) over self-reported explicit attitudes (measured using a questionnaire)
when it comes to racial discrimination (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz,
1998).
The present findings are important because they indicate that motivated
reasoning is linked to something other than the ability to engage in the rea-
soning process. ACS supposedly reflects the willingness to apply cognitive
effort, particularly when a salient response is available. This is a key charac-
teristic of the CRT, where an intuitively appealing response must be resisted
in favour of a more reasoned one. An intriguing, and somewhat challenging,
aspect of these findings is that ACS predicts not only a tendency to resist the
influence of beliefs on responding, but also the extent to which unbelievable
conclusions facilitate reasoning accuracy. Perhaps motivated reasoning
reflects the tendency for some participants to engage a “sceptical mindset”
when faced with an uncertain conclusion, a mindset that could also lead peo-
ple to question the salient response on the CRT because it seems “too good
to be true”. ACS possibly reflects an individual’s motivation to engage in
reasoning in circumstances where such uncertainty is detected. High ACS
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does not necessarily seem to decrease the absolute amount of bias, but rather
shift the locus of the effect from responding to reasoning.
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